The Camel Curse: Why the Banks’ Stablecoin Venture Is Doomed—And Why Buying Circle Is Their Only Shot at Winning

In the cutthroat arena of technology and finance, joint ventures (JVs) promise to pool expertise for breakthroughs. But as the old saying goes, “A camel is a horse designed by committee.” This quip nails the chaos of partnerships where too many equals with overlapping strengths churn out mediocrity. The recent buzz about America’s biggest banks—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo—planning a joint stablecoin initiative is a textbook case of this trap. In tech, especially markets with network effects like stablecoins, your #1, #2 or nobody…it’s a winner-take-most game. Circle’s USDC, the #2 stablecoin with $187 billion in Q1 2025 transactions and a real shot at overtaking Tether’s #1 spot, proves this. The banks’ JV, a partnership of financial titans with near-identical strengths, is almost certainly doomed to fail, creating a camel that won’t even place in the race. They’d be smarter to acquire Circle, let it innovate to seize the #1 spot, and avoid a distracting, low-odds bet on a new stablecoin that can’t afford to lose. Let’s unpack this with lessons from tech JVs like IBM-Apple’s flops and Sony Ericsson’s wins, showing why the banks are galloping toward failure.

The Stablecoin Stakes: Winner Takes Most

The banks aim to launch a joint stablecoin to streamline cross-border payments, leveraging blockchain for speed and cost savings. Stablecoins, pegged to assets like the U.S. dollar, are critical for institutional finance, but network effects—where value grows with user adoption—make this a brutal market. Tech history shows you’re either #1, #2, or nobody: think Google in search, Amazon in cloud, or Tether and USDC in stablecoins. Tether holds 60% market share, but Circle’s USDC, with 25% and $187 billion in Q1 2025 transactions, is a strong #2 with momentum to challenge for #1, thanks to its regulatory compliance and DeFi integration. The banks, with their vast resources, tech teams, and regulatory clout, can’t afford to end up as nobodies. Yet, their JV, driven by overlapping strengths, is a distraction with little chance of cracking the top two. Acquiring Circle, already a contender, and letting it run free to win is their only path to victory.

The Camel Curse: When Equals Breed Failure

The camel metaphor warns that design by committee—especially among equals with similar strengths—yields clunky results. In tech JVs, this happens when partners overlap in capabilities, sparking conflict and inefficiency. Success demands complementary strengths, where each fills the other’s gaps. When partners are too alike, with no clear leader, the JV flops. The banks’ stablecoin plan, with each bringing financial muscle and tech expertise, risks this fate. The cemetery of tech JVs displays why this camel won’t win the stablecoin race.

Failed JVs: Camels That Missed the Podium

• Kaleida Labs (IBM and Apple, 1991–1995)
  IBM and Apple’s Kaleida Labs aimed to create ScriptX, a multimedia standard to rival Microsoft. Both brought software prowess, but their overlapping strengths led to chaos. Apple’s consumer flair clashed with IBM’s enterprise mindset, fueling power struggles. With no clear leader, Kaleida burned $40 million, delayed products, and folded without impact. The banks’ JV, with each vying for blockchain control, risks similar infighting, producing a stablecoin that’s neither #1 nor #2.
• Taligent (IBM and Apple, 1992–1998)
  Taligent, another IBM-Apple misfire, sought a new OS to challenge Windows. Both partners had OS expertise (Apple’s Macintosh, IBM’s OS/2), but their equal footing bred conflict—Apple pushed consumer, IBM enterprise. The result: a delayed, complex framework (TalAE) that cost over $100 million and never launched as an OS. The banks’ stablecoin, with redundant tech and regulatory strengths, could stall in debates, missing the network effects needed to compete with USDC.
• Nokia-Microsoft Partnership (2011–2014)
  Nokia and Microsoft teamed up to merge Nokia’s hardware with Windows Phone, targeting Apple and Android. Both saw themselves as mobile leaders, leading to overlap—Nokia clung to Symbian, Microsoft pushed Windows Phone. Without complementary strengths (e.g., a strong app ecosystem), they flopped, costing Microsoft a $7.6 billion write-off. The banks’ JV, with each bank mirroring the others’ capabilities, risks a similar fate: a stablecoin that’s nobody in a market ruled by Tether and USDC.

These failures scream one truth: JVs of equals with overlapping strengths breed camels that can’t compete. The banks’ stablecoin venture is on this path, with little hope of overtaking Tether or USDC.

Successful JVs: Horses That Won the Race

Contrast these with JVs where complementary strengths fueled victory, showing what the banks could achieve by acquiring Circle.

• Sony Ericsson (2001–2012)
  Sony’s consumer design (Walkman, Cyber-shot) paired with Ericsson’s telecom expertise created phones that hit 10% global market share by 2007. Sony’s telecom weakness was Ericsson’s strength, and vice versa, ensuring clear roles. This balance made Sony Ericsson a #2 player behind Nokia, not a nobody. The banks, lacking such differentiation, won’t match this with a new stablecoin but could by leveraging Circle’s crypto expertise.
• ARM Holdings (1990–present)
  ARM, born from Apple, Acorn, and VLSI, thrived because each filled a gap: Apple’s design, Acorn’s RISC tech, VLSI’s fabrication. This synergy led to ARM’s architecture powering 95% of smartphones, a #1 in its field. The banks’ JV, with redundant strengths, can’t replicate this, but buying Circle—whose blockchain complements their distribution—could.
• Samsung Corning Precision Materials (1973–2014)
  Corning’s glass innovation meshed with Samsung’s display manufacturing, dominating LCD and OLED markets with billions in revenue. Their complementary roles avoided overlap, unlike the banks’ likely turf wars. Acquiring Circle would let the banks focus on scale while Circle drives tech, mirroring this success.

These JVs won by balancing strengths, a model the banks can’t follow with a JV but could with Circle.

Why Buy Circle? The Only Way to Win

In a winner-take-most market, the banks can’t afford to be #3 or worse. Circle’s USDC, the #2 stablecoin, is their ticket to the top. With $187 billion in Q1 2025 transactions and 25% market share, USDC has network effects—accepted across DeFi, exchanges, and merchants—and a shot at dethroning Tether, especially with Circle’s regulatory edge (FinCEN-registered). A new stablecoin JV, starting from zero, faces insurmountable odds:

• Network Effects: Tether and USDC’s dominance leaves little room for a new entrant, much like Google’s grip on search.
• Overlap Risks: The banks’ similar strengths—blockchain (JPMorgan’s Onyx), retail (Bank of America), compliance (Wells Fargo) —guarantee conflict, echoing Kaleida’s failure.
• Time and Cost: Building a stablecoin from scratch, like Taligent’s OS, takes years and billions, with no guarantee of adoption.

Acquiring Circle avoids these pitfalls:

• Instant Contender: USDC’s #2 status gives the banks a platform to challenge Tether, not a nobody stablecoin.
• Innovation Freedom: Circle’s crypto agility, unhampered by bank bureaucracy, can push USDC to #1, like Sony Ericsson’s nimble phones.
• Complementary Fit: Circle’s blockchain expertise fills the banks’ crypto gap, while their scale and regulatory clout boost USDC’s reach, avoiding Nokia-Microsoft’s overlap.
• Proven Model: Sony’s buyout of Ericsson’s stake in 2012 leveraged a winning brand (Xperia) without committee chaos. Circle’s acquisition could do the same.

The banks’ JV is a distraction, doomed to produce a camel that won’t crack the top two. Buying Circle is their shot at owning the #1 stablecoin.

The Path Forward: Bet on the Horse, Not the Camel

The camel metaphor warns that committees of equals breed failure. In stablecoins, where network effects make #1 or #2 the only options, the banks’ JV—riddled with overlapping strengths—is a losing bet. History, from Kaleida’s flop to ARM’s triumph, shows that complementary partnerships win. By acquiring Circle and letting USDC chase #1, the banks can avoid the camel curse, sidestep a doomed JV, and claim victory in the winner-take-most stablecoin race.

What do you think? Will the banks see the light, or are they destined for another camel? Share your thoughts below!